

HQ ARRC Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis (CCA) Trial

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Hugh Richardson joined the UK Defence Operational Analysis Establishment in 1971 where he worked on defence planning and operational analysis (OA) studies. In 1984, he was posted to 1(BR) Corps HQ in Germany as the scientific adviser providing OA and conducting field trials. After four years Hugh was posted to MoD UK to advise Requirements Staff on future RISTA/C2 systems. During this time he was seconded to NATO as a specialist adviser to SHAPE to assist in the Conventional Force Europe Reductions Talks analysis in 1990. In 1991 he led the UK scientific team in the Gulf during Op GRANBY providing OA, scientific and technical advice to all UK Land Forces, for which he was awarded the OBE. With UK operations in Bosnia Hugh became the scientific adviser for this operation at HQ Land Command, whilst continuing to develop OA support to senior commanders. In 1993 he was awarded individual merit promotion to Grade 6 (B1) for this work. With the creation of the PJHQ at Northwood in April 96, Hugh was appointed the first scientific adviser. He was responsible for the coordination and conduct of scientific OA studies in support of planning and the conduct of UK joint operations world-wide. After a short spell in Dstl, he joined HQ ARRC in Dec 2002 as Head of the Operational Analysis Branch returning to Front Line Operational Analysis.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION / BACKGROUND.

The preparation of key leaders for meetings and negotiations has been recognised by HQ ARRC as an area requiring improvement. HQ ARRC, with assistance from the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) trialed Confrontation and Collaboration Analysis (CCA) on Exercise ARRCAD GUARD 05 during 7 to 11 March 05.

CCA is a tool that can assist in the preparation of key leaders for external engagements with co-operative and non-compliant parties. During Phase 2 of the exercise a number of staff officers, Majors and Lieutenant Colonels (OF3 / OF4) were trained in the use of the CCA technique to enable a CCA

Team to form up during Phase 3 of the exercise in order to support 4 x negotiations involving key leaders. Concurrently during Phase 2, the key leaders who were to carry out the negotiations and other senior staff officers were provided with a detailed introduction to the CCA technique.

EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS.

The CCA trial was a “quasi” experiment and the results, shown below, provided a holistic insight into the requirements for external engagements / negotiations.

- The process of formally briefing and debriefing key leaders for each meeting was very valuable.
- Those conducting the briefing must be inside the Commander's mind and maintain situational awareness to provide accurate judgment on all the issues.
- Advice on negotiation strategy is not required for a Commander, who is experienced in negotiation at this level. This may not be true for other key leaders with less experience.
- The time and effort involved in the CCA process as trialed on Exercise ARRCAD GUARD may not be worth the output.
- There is a requirement to prioritise which meetings get the full treatment and which are prepared for by just collating information and “lines to take.”

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

CCA is just one tool that can assist in the preparation for negotiations. The following recommendations are made as a result of the trial:

1. A post should be established with the sole function of preparing key leaders for important negotiations.
2. CCA is but one tool that may or may not be used.
3. CCA (if used) can be invisible to the Key Leader being briefed. A short brief covering the major issues is all that is required.
4. The external engagements need to be prioritised to identify those meetings which require full preparation.
5. The formal briefing / debriefing of key leaders before and after negotiations should continue

HQ ARRC CONFRONTATION & COLLABORATION ANALYSIS (CCA) TRIAL

The Operational Analysis Branch (OAB) arranged for the HQ ARRC Command Group to receive a CCA introduction brief in August 2004. The briefing was carried out by Gen

(Retd) Sir Rupert Smith and Mr Andrew Tait (Idea Sciences). It was subsequently decided that CCA merited further investigation to see how it could assist HQ ARRC and its key leaders in the preparation for external negotiations and engagements.

Further work by OAB highlighted that JWC CDE¹ Branch had been tasked by HQ SACT² to conduct a CCA experiment as part of the official NATO experimentation programme. COSARRC invited JWC to use Ex ARRCADDE GUARD 05 as vehicle to trial CCA within a real operational headquarters during a Command Post Exercise (CPX) based on the HQ ARRC “Mesopotamia” exercise scenario.

The preparation of key leaders for meetings and negotiations was recognised by HQ ARRC as an area requiring improvement. The lessons learned process from previous exercises had highlighted this capability gap and ARRC staffs were instructed to identify how improvements could be made and how they could be linked to the ARRC’s Effects Based Approach. It was therefore considered that mutual benefit for both JWC and HQ ARRC could be derived from the CCA trial on Ex ARRCADDE GUARD 05.

AIM

The aims of the CCA trial were to:

1. Support 4 x negotiations conducted by Key Leaders (the Commander X 2, Deputy Commander and another senior leader).
2. Assess the utility of CCA as a method of assisting staff in preparing Key Leaders for negotiations.
3. Provide input for the HQ SACT / JWC CCA Experimentation Programme.

BACKGROUND

The aim of CCA is to provide staff with a tool to support key leaders in their preparation for negotiating with co-operating and non-compliant parties. A small group of staff can take initial direction from the key leader to analyse the issue in some detail, identify linkages, related subjects and parties, identify “dilemmas” in their own and opposing party’s negotiation positions and prepare the negotiation material. The key leader can then be briefed on options, lines to take and subsequently debriefed once the negotiation has taken place. The output from the group is a brief (verbal and written) and a list of key messages for use by the key leader during the negotiation.

The Theory of CCA: What it is. CCA is a methodology for determining what you want and how to make others want what you want. CCA provides a Formal Planning Process for:

¹ Joint Warfare Centre, Concepts Development and Experimentation Branch.

² Headquarters Supreme Allied Command Transformation.

- Dilemma resolution.
- Can be applied to all levels (diplomatic to tactical).

CCA helps to:

- Identify and understand parties and relationships.
- Reduce disputed issues to the bare minimum.
- Identify and analyse options and intentions out of a vast amount of data.

CCA appeared to support the staff process; however, other aspects are required for key leader preparation and were also considered:

- Staff Structure – Resources (manpower, equipment), composition, and location.
- Staff Product – Format of brief & debrief, format of written brief.

Preparatory work suggested that the CCA Team (CCAT) should be located in the Intelligence area of the headquarters and consist of a core team that included Information Ops (also nominated as the lead), Intelligence, Military Assistant (MA) to the Key Leader and the Political Adviser (POLAD). The CCAT was to have the ability to call in Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from across the headquarters as required.

EXPERIMENTATION PLAN

1. Conditions. The trial should be classified as a ‘quasi’ experiment³ as defined by Reference A. This is an acknowledged field of scientific practice and the majority of HQ ARRC experimentation carried out during CPXs is likely to fall into this category.
2. Training. During the week 14 – 18 Feb 05 (Ex ARRCAD E GUARD 05 - Phase 2) it was planned to train a number of OF3 / OF4 staff officers (Major and Lt Col) to form the CCAT and to conduct Commanders’ CCA training for the key leaders that were to subsequently be involved in negotiations during Phase 3 (CPX) of the exercise. This was amended to include two additional 3-hour training sessions to provide a detailed introduction to CCA for senior staff officers who were not directly involved with negotiations or the planning process.
3. Hypotheses. The following hypotheses were to be answered by the trial during Phase 3:

³ “Quasi experiments are characterized by: issues involving people in social and psychological rather than physiological contexts; poorer control of the variables and the experimental design; and work in the field rather than the laboratory”.

- CCA has utility in assisting staff preparing Key Leaders for negotiations with co-operating and non-compliant parties.
 - CCA has utility for Key Leaders in increasing their level of preparation for negotiations with co-operating and non-compliant parties.
4. Conduct of the Trial. The common modus operandi for all was:
- Receive the issue and any initial guidance from the key leader.
 - Conduct a short period of analysis with the CCAT.
 - Prepare written brief after which a short (15 mins) verbal brief was delivered.
 - Visit opposing role player in Exercise Control (EXCON) to ensure party would play “in character.”
 - Conduct negotiation - 2 x observers from CCA trial were present.
 - Conduct debrief with key leader and opposing party.

It was planned to support 4 x negotiations during the CPX as shown below:

- a. COMARRC with Calaban Minister of Housing.
- b. COMARRC with UNSRSG.
- c. DCOMARRC with Calaban Minister of Housing.
- d. Chief Joint Effects with faction player.

RESULTS

1. Phase 2 – Training. A positive response was received from the majority of officers who received training during the period. A period of 4 days training is considered the minimum period of time for an individual who is going to use CCA as a staff tool. Unfortunately the staff officer nominated to head up the CCAT was unable to attend any of the training.
2. Phase 2 – Other Applications of CCA. Another senior officer requested that the CCAT examine a real world issue for which he was drafting a paper. Subsequent work by Major Nick Cheetham with this officer on a one-to-one basis indicated that CCA could be used as a ‘soft’ analysis technique to gain insight into complex problems.
3. Phase 3 – Preparation. The CCAT met for 4 x 2 hrs sessions the week prior to the CPX to ensure that work on the first 2 negotiations had been started. This work was carried out

without the presence of the JWC mentor, who had received considerably more CCA training than members of HQ ARRC staff. The resulting work stood up to scrutiny from a CCA methodology perspective, indicating that those who had received training during Phase 2 could apply the technique.

4. Phase 4 – Execution (CPX). The experimentation ran largely to plan, with only minor adjustments. Results drawn from empirical observation and verbal feedback from the key leaders are shown below:
 - a. The process of formally briefing and debriefing each meeting was very valuable.
 - b. Those conducting the briefing must be inside the Commander's mind and maintain situational awareness to provide up to date and accurate judgment on all the issues.
 - c. Advice on negotiation strategy is not required for a Commander, who is experienced in negotiation at this level. This may not be true for other key leaders with less experience.
 - d. The time and effort involved in the CCA process as trialed on Ex ARRCAD GUARD may not be worth the output.
 - e. There is a requirement to prioritise which meetings get the full treatment and which are prepared for by just collating information and “lines to take.”

CONCLUSION

The CCA planning process provides a formal framework and standardized concept that enables staff to prepare Commanders for negotiations. It is not a completely new way of doing business and cannot aim to replace a Commander's skill, intuition or experience. CCA is but one tool that staff may or may not use depending upon the complexity of the negotiation. It is useful in gaining a greater understanding of the key issue and overall situation, and may have some utility outside negotiations. CCA is not intuitive at first and the training must be delivered in an interactive fashion with a highly trained mentor. Whilst this precludes CCA being used by large numbers of staff it is not unrealistic to train a small number of key staff to enable them to apply the technique.

The trial forced the team to consider negotiations holistically and where CCA fitted into the overall scheme of external engagements. Figure 1 attempts to conceptually summarise the components considered necessary to carry out successful negotiations and external engagements:




Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram for Requirements of Negotiations.

In answering the hypotheses stated at the start of the trial it would appear that CCA has more utility as a staff support tool for negotiations than in increasing the level of preparedness for key leaders.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As a result of the CCA trial on Ex ARRCAD E GUARD it was recommended that:

1. A post, SO1 External Engagements (SO1 Ext Eng) is established with the sole function of preparing key leaders for important negotiations.
2. SO1 Ext Eng is trained in CCA. This is but one tool that may or may not be used.
3. SO1 Ext Eng maintains situational awareness through attendance at key internal meetings and should have personal access to key leaders.
4. CCA training is NOT provided to large numbers of staff from across HQ ARRC. Specialist advice can be provided to SO1 Ext Eng without the SME having undergone CCA training.
5. CCA (if used) can be invisible to the Key Leader being briefed. A short brief covering the major issues is all that is required.
6. COSARRC prioritises which meetings require full preparation involving SO1 Ext Eng and which do not.

7. The formal briefing / debriefing of key leaders before and after negotiations continue.

REFERENCE

Dstl Code of Best Practice for Experimentation dated 25 Mar 05.